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Overview 
A reassurance function for policing was first considered by American psychologist Charles 
Bahn (1974: 338) as “feelings of safety that a citizen experiences when he knows that a police 
officer or patrol car is nearby.” This idea was taken forward in Britain by Martin Innes and 
colleagues in the early 2000s through the development of a signal crimes perspective. At this 
time, British policing implemented a National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) 
where local policing priorities were decided through consultation with local communities. The 
impact of reassurance policing has since spread and the approach has also been considered in 
Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
In this entry, the background to reassurance policing is considered with particular reference to 
the work of Charles Bahn and Martin Innes and colleagues. The development of a policy of 
reassurance policing in Britain is also examined. The successes and limitations of the approach 
are considered and three main issues identified: that reassurance needs to be a consideration 
for all policing; that increases in visible patrol need to be questioned (especially at a time of 
budget restraint); and that reassurance policing has the potential to be a model of democratic 
policing, but only if consultation is truly inclusive, for instance, including those that have been 
victimized and groups that have been targets of police activity such as young people, the 
homeless, and other minority and marginalized groups. 
 
 
 
2 
 
Fundamentals 
“Reassurance policing” is an approach to policing that emphasizes the importance of the police 
communicating a positive image to the public, that the public is reassured that the police are 
doing a good job. It is closely allied to “community policing,” “community-oriented policing 
services” (COPS), and “neighborhood policing.” The first to write about the reassurance 
function of policing was American psychologist Charles Bahn (1974). The context was the 
publication of the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al. 1974). According 
to the then Kansas City Chief of Police, Joseph D. McNamara (Kelling et al. 1974: vii), the 
experiment showed that “routine preventive patrol in marked police cars has little value in 
preventing crime or making citizens feel safe.” However, Bahn suggested police patrol still had 
an important function by increasing public awareness of police work and thereby providing 
visible reassurance (and hopefully making the public feel safer). He defined the reassurance 
function in the following terms: 
In addition to its more obvious functions, police patrol also has the function of citizen 
reassurance - providing feelings of safety that a citizen experiences when he knows that 
a police officer or patrol car is nearby. (Bahn 1974: 338) 
Bahn’s definition emphasized subjective feelings of safety rather than any objective measure, 
and the best way to provide reassurance, to make the public feel safer, was through visible and 
accessible police patrol: 
. . . when the man in the street asks for more police, he is really asking for the police to 
be on hand more frequently and more conspicuously when he is going about his daily 
business. (Bahn 1974: 340–341) 
After Bahn, there followed a long period during which time the reassurance function was not 
a major focus for policing. Crime continued to rise and so controlling the level of crime was 
the clear priority. Rather than focus on patrol, emphases were increasingly on professionalism 
and crime management, a decision that appeared to be backed by the research. Not only did the 
Kansas City Experiment question the value of patrol work (Kelling et al. 1974), but also the 
Newark Foot Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al. 1981). In this study, George Kelling’s team 
found that foot patrol did not reduce crime. However, more positively – and in support of 
Bahn’s position – they also found that foot patrol did have an impact on fear of crime and 
police satisfaction (see also Clarke and Hough 1984). 
Yet, a performance culture evolved in North America, Britain, and many other western nations 
more focused on crime control and prevention – for example, through forms of zero-tolerance 
or intelligence-led policing (Innes 2004). In Britain, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the focus 
had become volume crime while neglecting more minor disorders and antisocial behaviors 
(Millie and Herrington 2005). According to FitzGerald et al. (2002: 118), “quantitative 
performance management was narrowing the focus of police activity in ways that might put 
long-term investment in police-community relations at risk.” 
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At a time of rising crime, there were also high levels of fear of crime. However, from the mid-
1990s onward, recorded crime rates fell in most western nations. This fall in crime was not 
thought to be matched by falls in fear of crime (Innes 2004). The meaning and measurement 
of fear of crime are contested and the problem could be exaggerated (Farrall and Gadd 2004). 
There is not a straightforward relationship between crime rates, police activity, and fear of 
crime; in fact, in some jurisdictions, an aggressive approach to crime by the police may have 
resulted in greater fear of crime among marginalized populations (Innes 2004). Also, according 
to Innes, an emphasis on crime management meant that much police work became behind-the-
scenes analysis that was not visible to the public. An unintended consequence was an increased 
“social distance between police and policed” (Innes 2004: 156). 
However, despite claims that the level of fear of crime was a problem, British Crime Survey 
measures of “worry about crime” did fall from the mid-1990s (Millie and Herrington 2004, 
2005). Of greater importance than fear of crime – for a policy of reassurance policing – is 
public confidence in the police. In Britain, public confidence declined at the same time that 
recorded crime rates fell (Hough 2003). Furthermore, members of the pubic were unaware that 
crime rates had been falling; for instance, according to the Audit Commission (1999: 2): 
“Recorded crime fell by 14 per cent from 1995 and 1997, but fewer than one person in ten was 
aware that crime had decreased over this period.” The disjuncture between falling crime, the 
public’s ignorance of this fall (with many thinking it was rising), and falling confidence in the 
police became known as the “reassurance gap.” Feeding into this were concerns about fear of 
crime. British police introduced a policy of “reassurance policing” at the start of the new 
millennium as a response to concern over the “reassurance gap.” The answer to falling public 
confidence in policing was not it seemed greater managerial focus on performance, but a shift 
in focus to people’s perceptions: 
The current over-focus on crime figures as a substitute measure for police performance 
will not lead to greater public confidence. The public is convinced that the UK is a high-
crime society. A reassurance strategy will provide an opportunity to shift people’s 
perception and begin to change the embedded culture of fear of crime. (ACPO 2001: 
para.5.3) 
A focus on perceptions and feelings has been criticized. For some, the approach acquired the 
nicknames of “there, there policing” or “big hug policing” (Millie and Herrington 2004: 4). For 
others, it was little more than a public relations exercise and a re-branding of earlier attempts 
at community policing. According to FitzGerald et al. (2002), giving the impression that the 
public are safer without also tackling crime rates is hard to justify: 
If reassurance policing yields reductions in crime and disorder as well as reassurance, 
it is hard to see how it differs from effective policing. If it doesn’t yield these reductions, 
the case for it needs scrutiny. It is difficult to justify devoting limited police resources 
to policing activity that serves only to give people the impression they are safer from 
crime (FitzGerald et al. 2002: 132, emphasis in original). 
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The UK Home Office embraced the idea of reassurance policing and commissioned a study, 
“to identify ways to free-up officers’ time” in order to perform reassurance policing (PA 
Consulting 2001: v). According to the PA Consulting report, reassurance policing was defined 
as: 
. . . any sectoral policing activity that is visible within the community. It is the visibility 
of the policing effort that provides the reassurance. Hence, reassurance policing 
includes patrols – either directed or uncommitted, mobile or on foot – as well as visible 
policing of incidents. Reassurance policing is designed to address not only crime, but 
the fear of crime (PA Consulting 2001: 1). 
PA Consulting extended the definition from Bahn’s visible patrols to any form of policing that 
is visible to the public. The emphasis was on visibility as a means to address fear of crime. At 
the same time, a report by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) investigated 
“the role of police visibility and accessibility in public reassurance” (Povey 2001). For the 
HMIC report (Povey 2001: 20) reassurance was defined as “the extent to which individuals 
perceive that order and security exist within their local environment.” While PA Consulting 
focused on visibility, the HMIC report broadened this to “visibility, accessibility, and 
familiarity” (Povey 2001): 
• “Visibility: the level, profile and impact of police resources deployed within local 
communities. 
• Accessibility: the ease with which the public can obtain appropriate police 
information, access services or make contact with staff. 
• Familiarity: the extent to which police personnel know, and are known by, local 
communities.” (Povey 2001: 23–24). 
Taking the different definitions together reassurance is a subjective state influenced by 
perceptions/sense of order and security, and by fear of crime. The job of reassurance policing 
is to address these subjective feelings through increased police visibility, accessibility, and 
familiarity. Put simply, according to Innes (2007: 135), the police are assumed to have “an 
important role to play not just in making people safe but in making them feel safer also.” 
Key to this is the semiotic quality of police public encounters, whether this is while on patrol, 
when an incident is reported, through calls for service or any other mediated communication. 
Semiotics is an approach that attempts to understand the communicative quality or sign-value 
of things. Policing communicates different messages to different publics and this may be 
intimidation and suppression, or more positively, efficiency and reassurance. What the police 
communicate will be influenced by reputation, levels of trust and respect, experience of police-
public encounters, and visual cues such as the uniform, police car, or even station architecture 
and design (Millie 2010, 2012). Also of relevance here is symbolic interaction. For instance, 
drawing on Goffman (1959/1990) Innes posits that, “the reassurance function of policing 
recognises and seeks to harness the dramaturgical power of formal social control” (Innes 2007: 
133). In effect, the police officer’s role is a performance of control and reassurance. 
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The Signal Crimes Perspective 
In Britain, the communicative qualities of policing were the focus of the “signal crimes” 
perspective developed by a team from Surrey University, led by Martin Innes and Nigel 
Fielding (e.g., Innes and Fielding 2002). Alongside the influence of Bahn’s work on police 
reassurance, the signal crimes perspective was informed by psychological research into risk 
perception, especially that of Paul Slovic (1992). According to Slovic, risk can be amplified by 
a combination of “psychological, social, cultural, and political factors” (1992: 124). Slovic 
contended that each risk-related event holds a “signal value,” reflecting “the perception that 
the event provides new information about the likelihood of similar or more destructive future 
mishaps” (1992: 124). For the signal crimes perspective, this idea was transferred to 
criminogenic risks. According to Innes and Fielding (2002: 3.6): 
. . . public understanding of the seriousness of a risk is not defined solely by the 
characteristics of the event itself. Rather, it is the nature of the risk, it’s semiotic 
properties, together with the context in which it occurs, that shapes how it is interpreted 
and understood. 
From this perspective, it is not the seriousness of an event (however that is measured), but the 
signal value of an event that has the biggest effect. This will be influenced by a range of factors 
including, for example, perception of seriousness and impact on individual or neighborhood, 
frequency, time and location of event, behavioral expectations, and media coverage. Innes and 
Fielding went on to state that “the most important incidents in shaping popular fear and anxiety 
may not necessarily be only those that are traditionally defined by juridical discourses as 
serious crimes” (2002: 3.6). In fact, they concluded, it could be “relatively trivial” disorders, 
incivilities, or antisocial behaviors in one situation, but serious crimes in another that have the 
greatest signal value. According to Innes and Fielding (2002: 5.2): 
A signal crime/event can be defined as an incident that is disproportionately influential 
in terms of causing a person or persons to perceive themselves to be at risk in some 
sense. 
The signal crime has disproportionate effect on perceptions of security, it is a warning that 
something is perceived to be wrong with a neighborhood or with society in general. By 
focusing police attention on whatever is identified as the signal crime(s) for a particular 
neighborhood, the hope is that there will be bigger gains in improving feelings of security and 
reassurance. For the police to adopt a signal crimes approach, they need to consult various 
publics and identify which crimes or disorders act as “signals” in particular neighborhoods. 
There can be strong and weak signals and not everyone will interpret the signals the same way, 
or the same in different spatial-temporal contexts; for instance:  
What for young people is merely part of their normal routine and lifestyle (i.e. hanging 
around on street corners during the evening), may be construed by older residents as 
signals that they should not go out at night, in order to avoid threats to their safety. 
(Innes and Fielding 2002: 5.10). 
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There is a risk that certain “usual suspects” may be unjustly perceived as signals of disorder, 
for instance, including young people who congregate, the street homeless, or other minority 
and marginalized populations. If police enforcement policy is informed by a signal crimes 
perspective, then the disproportionate targeting or “zero tolerance” of those labeled as signals 
would need to be avoided. A similar criticism has been levelled at the “broken windows” 
perspective of Wilson and Kelling (1982); in fact, “broken windows” and “signal crimes” have 
a lot in common. For the broken windows perspective, disorder is “read” as an indicator of 
decline, causing people to withdraw from disorderly areas leading to a decline in informal 
social control, thus making crime more likely. In effect, disorder is thought to cause crime to 
occur. However – drawing on Sampson and Raudenbush (1999) – Innes and Fielding contend 
that disorder does not lead to crime, but that crime and disorder are functionally equivalent: 
“Thus disorder is part and parcel of crime itself. Graffiti does not cause robbery, but a lack of 
informal social control is a cause of both” (Innes and Fielding 2002: 4.3). Alongside certain 
crimes, disorders, or people having a “signal value,” Innes and colleagues posited that the 
police can act as “control signals,” especially through visible patrol. This is supported by the 
informal social control enacted by active communities. 
According to Innes (2004), “reassurance” is a style of policing that can deliver enhanced 
security and is not in itself an outcome. For Innes (2004), reassurance policing consists of these 
three parts: 
• “high visibility patrols performed by officers who are known to the local public; 
• the targeting of ‘signal crimes’ and ‘signal disorders’; and 
• informal social control performed by communities” (Innes 2004: 151). 
 
The British National Reassurance Policing Project (NRPP) 
From 2002 to 2003, a strategy trial of reassurance policing was run by Surrey Police and the 
Metropolitan Police in association with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and 
the Home Office. The business case for the strategy trial had five elements: 
• Public confidence in police choices and solutions through identifying “signal” concerns 
through public consultation 
• Visible control – public reassurance by seeing visible proof that their problems are important 
to the police and are being controlled 
• A targeted, intelligence-led approach focusing resources on community signals through 
problem solving 
• Joint action from the police and other partner agencies 
• Dedicated resources as much as is practicable (Millie and Herrington 2005) 
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A range of methods were utilized in order to identify which crimes and disorders acted as 
“signals” (Innes et al. 2009). In the first instance, drawing on the work of Sampson and 
Raudenbush (1999) and others, a visual/environmental audit was conducted of a neighborhood 
to identify potential “signal crimes” and “control signals.” Secondly, drawing in particular on 
the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (Skogan and Hartnett 1997), local people were 
consulted on what were perceived to be signals. This was through the use of public perception 
surveys and community consultation groups. The Surrey University team also interviewed 
individual residents using maps to guide responses (Innes et al. 2009).  
The full National Reassurance Policing Project (NRPP) was launched in 2003 and operated 
until 2005 in 16 sites located across eight force areas. The eight forces were Greater Manchester 
Police, Lancashire Police, Leicestershire Police, Metropolitan Police, Merseyside Police, 
Surrey Police, Thames Valley Police, and West Midlands Police. The program was evaluated 
by the Home Office (Tuffin et al. 2006). According to the Home Office evaluation, the NRPP 
aimed to achieve: 
• “Reduced anti-social behaviour and improved quality of life; 
• Reduced fear of crime and improved sense of safety; 
• Increased public satisfaction with, and confidence in, the police; and, 
• Improved social capacity” (Tuffin et al. 2006: xi). 
This was an ambitious list. In fact, on the ground, reassurance policing was interpreted as 
having other additional objectives (Millie and Herrington 2005). For instance, the approach 
was regarded as a means of gathering community intelligence. Furthermore, it was thought to 
provide much needed structure to community policing, to lead to improvements in the local 
environment, and to reduce overall crime. According to Millie and Herrington (2005: 53), the 
central focus of reassurance policing needed to be to improve confidence in the police and to 
provide legitimacy for policing decisions. According to the Home Office evaluation, the aims 
of the NRPP were to be achieved through: 
• “Targeted policing activity and problem solving to tackle crimes and disorder which 
matter in neighbourhoods; 
• Community involvement in the process of identifying priorities and taking action to 
tackle them; and 
• The presence of visible, accessible and locally known authority figures in 
neighbourhoods, in particular police officers and police community support officers” 
(Tuffin et al. 2006: xii). 
The involvement of communities in identifying policing priorities can be regarded as part of 
broader “localism” agendas. According to the Home Office evaluation, after program 
implementation, more people thought crime had decreased, there were positive effects on 
public satisfaction with the police, and positive effects on perceptions of antisocial behavior 
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and of feelings of safety (but not on fear of crime). Furthermore, there were improvements in 
levels of police visibility and familiarity and in public engagement. That said, public attendance 
at meetings was no greater in trail sites than it was in control sites (Tuffin et al. 2006). It was 
suggested that public consultation should extend beyond standard public meetings to include 
“street briefings, door knocking and ‘have a say days’” (Tuffin et al. 2006: xvi), and when extra 
effort was put into public engagement, this was noticed by the public. The conclusion of the 
evaluation was as follows: 
The research did not provide a test of the ‘signal crimes’ perspective, developed by 
Martin Innes, but does suggest that a policing approach which targets public priorities 
can have a positive impact both on crime and on public perceptions. . . . The limited 
improvements in worry and social capacity indicators suggest the need for further 
survey work to examine future change in the sites. (Tuffin et al. 2006: 95). 
By 2004, policing policy was already moving forward with, in the Metropolitan Police, the 
emergence of a Safer Neighbourhoods Programme (Herrington and Millie 2006). This evolved 
into a national Neighbourhood Policing Programme (Innes 2005) and by 2008, Neighbourhood 
Policing Teams were allocated across all of England and Wales (Millie 2010). Key elements 
of reassurance policing survived in this new format. 
In Britain, policing policy is very much tied in with national politics and in 2010, a new 
Conservative-led coalition government came into power. The financial crisis led to a decision 
to cut public sector finance – including a 20 % cut in central government funding of policing 
(Millie and Bullock 2012). It was not certain how reassurance/neighborhood policing would 
survive and in what form. That said, the coalition emphasized localism with the first 
democratically elected Police and Crime Commissioners in Britain introduced in November 
2012. Reassurance policing’s emphasis on community involvement could be attractive to the 
newly elected Commissioners. 
 
Issues and Controversies 
The Home Office evaluation of Reassurance Policing was broadly positive regarding the 
approach’s effectiveness. The approach may not have had much of an impact on fear of crime 
or on social capacity, yet the improvements in perceptions of crime and antisocial behavior and 
public attitudes toward the police were not insignificant. Yet there are potential issues and 
controversies with the approach, which are outlined here. 
Just Another Form of Community Policing 
Firstly, there was always a risk that reassurance policing would be viewed as “just another 
project” or the same as community policing but under a different banner (Herrington and Millie 
2006). While some of those involved in theNRPP thought it was the same as before, others saw 
it as something much more. For one officer involved in the strategy trial, the approach needed 
to be a “golden thread” running through all policing (Millie and Herrington 2005: 54) and not 
just a consideration for those involved directly in the project. There is a danger that if 
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reassurance is restricted to a particular project, then those not involved could ruin any advances 
made by “loose talk” or “loose action.” For instance, this could be by disproportionate targeting 
of “usual suspect” minority populations; or it could be the removal of police identification 
numbers during public protest, as has occurred in Britain (Millie 2010). If reassurance is a 
“golden thread” through all policing, then such activities would be questioned. 
Reassurance and Visibility 
A further focus for reassurance policing is improved police visibility. An original intention for 
reassurance policing, as outlined by Bahn (1974), was for officers to be a fixed point of 
reference on the street. This part of Bahn’s approach was not incorporated into the NRPP; 
however, there is scope for improved visible (and fixed point) reassurance through the effective 
use of police stations and neighborhood bases in a similar fashion to the Japanese system of 
koban (Millie 2010). 
Popular politics frequently call for more police officers on the beat, irrespective of their 
seemingly low effectiveness in reducing crime, as famously demonstrated by the Kansas City 
experiment. Instead, the police are there to be seen so as to improve people’s feelings of 
security. According to Loader (2006: 207), there is a “self-propelling circle whereby popular 
demands, and the numbers of police supplied in a bid to meet them, are both endlessly ratcheted 
up.” There are clear resource implications of highly visible policing. At a time of fiscal 
restraint, the deployment of large numbers of locally based officers, with a remit to be highly 
visible, becomes less of an option. 
Reassurance Policing as Democratic Policing 
A central focus for reassurance policing is that neighborhood priorities are identified by the 
community. There is a risk that such locally identified priorities will be in conflict with force 
or national policing objectives. Furthermore, there is an assumption that all neighborhoods 
want police intervention (some may prefer the police to go away). 
Yet, on the surface, the approach is a commendable example of democratic policing. 
Legitimacy in policing decisions is maximized as decisions are made by “the community” 
rather than being dictated by police or government hierarchy. However, there is a potential 
problem that those consulted may not represent all the multiple communities that live in a 
neighborhood. Furthermore, they may constitute the “worried well,” rather than a group with 
experience of victimization (Millie 2010). In such cases, the “signal crimes” identified will be 
based on perception more than actual crime and antisocial behavior (Crawford 2007). The 
involvement of “hard to reach” or less visible or vocal groups is notoriously difficult (e.g., 
Skogan and Hartnett 1997). And, as already noted, there is a danger that “usual suspects” – 
such as young people, street homeless, or other minority and marginalized populations – will 
become labeled as “signals” and disproportionately policed. According to Loader (2006), if 
those consulted have expectations for “total security” that cannot be met, then even they may 
not be reassured. Furthermore, there is a danger that those consulted may suffer consultation 
fatigue and the police will just assume they know what is required, as Herrington and Millie 
(2006: 159) have observed: 
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. . . we were frequently told that the police knew what the concerns were, the public 
were tired of being consulted and just wanted something done. This may turn out to be 
the case, but effective and inclusive consultation is essential if policing is to avoid a 
“ready, fire, then aim” criticism that is often levelled at them when adopting new 
initiatives. 
 
Conclusions 
The idea of “reassurance policing” was first considered in the USA through the work of 
psychologist Charles Bahn (1974). However, it was not until the early 2000s in Britain that it 
was taken forward by Martin Innes and colleagues with the development of the signal crime 
perspective. A theoretically informed method was developed for delivering a reassurance 
approach to policing and reassurance policing became a major strand of British policing policy. 
The approach has also had wider international impact. For instance, reassurance policing has 
also been considered for policing in Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 
The evaluation of the NRPP in Britain was largely positive, that reassurance policing has the 
potential to provide an approach that can improve confidence in the police and improve 
perceptions of crime and antisocial behavior. There are however obstacles that would need to 
be negotiated in order to maximize effectiveness: 
• Firstly, reassurance would need to be integral to all policing activity, from call handling 
through to public order policing. Reassurance would be most effective as a consideration for 
all officers, rather than as a bolt-on extra and only a concern for a smaller number of 
“community” or “reassurance” officers. 
• Secondly, the assumption that more and more visible officers are always better would need 
to be questioned, especially at a time of fiscal restraint. Other forms of improved visibility 
could be investigated, such as improved use of police stations and neighborhood bases/shop 
front offices. 
• Thirdly the democratic potential of reassurance Policing would need to be taken seriously – 
that consultation does not focus on the “worried well,” but instead the views and experiences 
of those who have been victimized or have been the targets of police action are actively sought. 
To be truly inclusive and reassuring to all community members, consultation would need to 
include young people, the homeless, and other minority and marginalized groups. 
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